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Abstract
Background: Demand-responsive transport is an alternative to fixed-route, fixed-scheduled transport services in
low-demand areas.
Objective: This paper discusses the welfare and distributional consequences of the implementation of request
stops (RSs) on a scheduled fixed-stop transport service.
Method: The discussion is based on a general welfare model. The focus is on discussing how the magnitudes of
the welfare effects on different groups of travellers are influenced by travel patterns and the characteristics of the
travellers involved.
Results: The effects of implementing RSs are critically dependent on the booking procedure, the variation in
demand throughout the day, and the travellers’ time values per hour when on the mode and when arriving at the
destinations before having any appointments. Moreover, the benefits for the operators and the authorities depend
strongly on the risk profile in the tendering contract.
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1 Introduction
Changes in population density and settlement patterns,
an ageing population, and increased car ownership
have resulted in significant challenges for local public
transport systems [11, 37]. These changes have par-
ticularly disfavoured conventional fixed-stop (FS)
transport services in rural areas. Therefore, more
demand-responsive transport (DRT) services have
been established in low-demand areas [1, 7, 20, 22,
33, 37]. There are different definitions of DRT ser-
vices [6, 15, 28]. DRT services are usually considered
‘intermediate’ forms of transport, somewhere between
public and individual transport solutions, that cover a
wide range of transport services [21, 22].
The research on DRT services in rural areas has
largely focused on system design, the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of different means of organising the service,
and technological issues regarding, for example, infor-
mation systems, real-time information, telematics, and
intelligent transport systems (cf. the literature review in
Section 2). Thus, the main research effort has focused
on the operational and logistic challenges related to
DRT services. Far less focus has been on the elaboration
of the welfare implications of DRT services. Therefore,
the aim of this article is to discuss the welfare and distri-
butional consequences of DRT services in rural areas.
We focus on transport services that Koffman [21] refers
to as request-stop (RS) services, that is, a conventional
fixed-route that also serves stops near the route in re-
sponse to passengers’ requests.
The forthcoming discussion is related to fast craft ser-
vices, which are critical modes of transport along the
Norwegian coastline. Many of these services have several
ports of call, and some of the calls have only RSs due to
the limited demand for trips. In this county where fast
craft services are most important (Nordland), 41% of the
ports of call have an RS, whereas 34% have an FS. The
remaining 25% of ports of call have an RS and FS for
which service is dependent on the weekday, Jørgensen,
Mathisen, and Solvoll [18]. The situation in other coastal
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counties in Norway is similar; the use of RSs on these
transport services is significant and increases as the
population in rural areas decreases, implying reduced
demand for transport services. Although we focus on
the mode of transport where RSs are most common, the
forthcoming discussion is also relevant to other trans-
port means such as ferries and buses.
We organise the article as follows. Section 2 is a brief
literature review. In Section 3, the theoretical approach
regarding the distributional and welfare consequences of
implementing an RS at a call instead of an FS is pre-
sented. Section 4 is a thorough discussion of the magni-
tudes of the welfare effects on the involved groups.
Section 5 provides an example of the application of the
welfare model. Last, in Section 6, we summarise the
main findings and offer concluding remarks.
2 Literature review
A significant research effort has been made to investi-
gate the design and classification of the types of DRT
services. Mageean and Nelson [22] divide DRT route
concepts into three main groups: (i) semi-fixed routes
(i.e. services that can deviate to predefined and non-
predefined stop points with fixed intermediate stop
points), (ii) flexible routes (i.e. services that can deviate
to predefined and non-predefined stop points with no
fixed intermediate stop points), and (iii) virtual flexible
routes (i.e. services that stop at non-predefined stop
points with no fixed intermediate stop points).
Koffman [21] operates with as many as six types of
flexible transit services: (i) ‘route deviation’ (i.e. a regular
scheduled service that can deviate to serve demand-
responsive requests within a zone around the path), (ii)
‘point deviation’ [i.e. similar to (i) but with a possibility
to serve a limited number of stops within the zone with-
out any regular path between the stops], (iii) ‘demand re-
sponsive connector’ (i.e. vehicles that operate in a
demand-responsive mode within a zone with scheduled
transfer points that connect with a fixed-route network),
(iv) ‘request stop’ (i.e. a conventional fixed-route that
also serves stops near the route in response to
passengers’ requests), (v) ‘flexible-route segments’ (i.e. a
conventional fixed-route that switches to a demand-
responsive operation for a limited portion of the route),
and (vi) ‘zone route’ (i.e. vehicles operate in a demand-
responsive mode along a corridor with established de-
parture and arrival times at one or more endpoints).
Because demand for public transport in rural areas is
low, the research has focused on designing flexible-route
systems with low system costs [26] where the users’ ben-
efits are considered in different manners, for example,
by the performance measure of the transit system [30],
service punctuality [5], or response speed to requests [4].
The use of mobile technology and real-time informa-
tion has also been a focus in the literature. Papangelis,
Nelson, Sripada, and Beecroft [27] investigate the effects
of mobile real-time passenger information (RTPI) on
passengers in rural areas. They find that RTPI has posi-
tive effects on the passengers’ perceived control over
their journey and their perceived waiting time. The basis
for a study by Watkins, Ferris, Rutherford, and Layton
[38] is that an inexpensive means to combat the percep-
tion of unreliability from a user perspective is real-time
transit information. A critical finding is that mobile real-
time information reduces customers’ perceived waiting
time and actual waiting time.
Regarding welfare consideration, Gomes, de Sousa,
and Dias [10] discuss DRT services in relation to the
problem of sustainability and social inclusion challenges
in transport. They indicate that to prevent the failure of
DRT projects, it is critical to solve the underlying model
in an efficient manner and understand how different
manners of operating the service affect customers and
operators. Saeed and Kurauchi [33] discuss enhancing
transit services in rural areas with complex road network
topographies where fixed services are less available or
are cost ineffective. They discuss services that minimise
the sum of operators’ costs and users’ costs. Kim and
Schonfeld [20] use an algorithm to maximise welfare
(consumer surplus + producer surplus) with elastic de-
mand relations for fixed-route and flexible-route services
in systems with multiple dissimilar regions and periods.
In general, conventional services are increasingly prefer-
able to flexible-route services as demand densities and
route lengths increase. Furth and Muller [9] investigate
the problem of holding buses to scheduled departure
times at timepoints. Based on an objective to minimise
the sum of operating costs and user costs, they demon-
strate that a timepoint’s optimal strictness (probability of
holding) increases with the demand for boardings at the
timepoint. However, the effect diminishes as stops be-
come farther from the start of the route, and welfare
benefits compared with using a uniform percentage of
slack across the route may be small.
Additionally, a substantial amount of literature has
evaluated the types of DRT services. By using 20 years of
data, Rodier, Johnston, and Shabazian [31] employ a
travel demand model to simulate the travel, emissions,
and welfare effects of advanced public transport system
(APTS) technologies in the Sacramento, California, re-
gion (in the United States) for 2015. Their simulations
show that the APTS technology generated an economic
benefit when total operating costs were included. Diana,
Quadrifoglio, and Pronello [8] assess how the organisa-
tional form of the transit system may affect the environ-
ment in terms of distance travelled between a traditional
fixed-route and a DRT service. The results indicate that
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DRT services minimise emissions for high-quality ser-
vice level and low-demand density scenarios.
Mageean and Nelson [22] introduce the concept of
telematics-based DRT services and focus on DRT tech-
nologies and the positive influence this technology has
on DRT services. Brake, Nelson, and Wright [2] empha-
sise that (at least) four areas related to DRT require sub-
stantial attention: legal and regulatory issues,
technological issues, service and system design issues,
and the sustainability of the DRT service. They stress
that as demand becomes marginal, more flexible trans-
port solutions are required. The paper by Brake and
Nelson [1] has a user perspective. Based on their case
study of Northumberland, they state that rural public
transport services will require wider area network
planning, greater cooperation between service providers
(e.g. in the form of partnerships), and improved under-
standing of passenger requirements. Mulley, Nelson,
Teal, Wright, and Daniels [25] explore the extent to
which barriers to the implementation of flexible trans-
port services (FTS) identified in New South Wales,
Australia, have been encountered and overcome in the
United States and Europe. They state that transport ser-
vice planners and providers can obtain greater use of
FTS by sharing best practices and information on over-
coming barriers to implementation.
Velaga, Nelson, Wright, and Farrington [35] explore
the context of public transport provision in rural and re-
mote areas. Experiences from selected case studies in
Scotland confirm that FTS provides a critical contribu-
tion to the public transport system in such areas. Ryley,
Stanley, Enoch, Zanni, and Quddus [32] investigate the
sustainability credentials of DRT services using evidence
from the United Kingdom. Of the DRT services investi-
gated, those targeting airline or train passengers have
potential. However, these services are in direct competi-
tion with cars; thus, their success depends on the cost
and availability of parking spaces. Some of the DRT
schemes explored fulfil social needs such as access to
shopping facilities or hospitals, but the cost challenges
are prohibitive.
Davison et al. [7] use a national survey of DRT pro-
viders in Great Britain to examine the design,
performance, rationale, and likely futures of DRT
schemes. Their findings suggest that increasing the
role of stakeholders from the voluntary sector and the
private sector results in greater use of smaller vehi-
cles. Notably, cost and funding remain dominant con-
cerns of DRT service providers. Wang et al. [37]
investigate how individual-level factors influence the
use of DRT systems in rural Lincolnshire, England.
The analysis shows that people who are disabled,
commuters, or residents of less densely populated
areas are likely to travel more frequently by DRT.
Jain, Ronald, Thompson, and Winter [16] provide and
evaluate a methodology to estimate the demand pat-
terns in an area that wants to avoid ambivalent and
expensive user-preference surveys in the design of a
DRT service. They state that analysis of demographic
and trip characteristics of the population can be used
to predict the spatial demand pattern of a proposed
transport service in a target city.
The literature review shows that the main research
effort regarding DRT services has focused on the im-
pact of IT-systems on the efficiency of such services
and the importance of different means to organise the
service administratively and operationally. Some re-
search has also investigated the welfare economic im-
pact of DRT. This body of research has focused on
operational costs and user benefits. Notably, more
principled discussions regarding welfare effects and
the distributional impacts of DRT have received scant
attention.
3 Theoretical approach
3.1 Welfare impacts of request stops – the illustrative
example
We discuss consequences of RSs based on what Koff-
man [21] defines as a ‘request stop’ service. The wel-
fare and distributional consequences are exemplified
by a fast craft service connecting three settlements,
each of which has a port (Fig. 1). Without much loss
of generality, we highlight the main effects of RSs by
focusing on the simplified situation where there is
only one potential RS (port B) between two FSs (port
A and C). However, in Section 4.5, we mention the
following problem: several RSs (B1, B2, . . , BM) might
be between the FSs A and C.
Initially, the fast craft service connects places A – B –
C on a regular basis, that is, all three places have an FS.
The service provider receives subsidies from the trans-
port authorities that are supposed to cover the gap
between expected income and operating costs (net con-
tract). Due to limited traffic to and from place B, located
between place A and place C, the transport authorities
considered offering place B an RS instead of an FS. We
assume that no minimum requirements for the number
of travellers to/from place B are set to call it, and that
the ticket price is unchanged. This situation could be
regarded as a Dial-a-Ride Problem or an extended vari-
ant of a Vehicle Routing Problem [5]. However, in the
case of a scheduled transport service, the sequence of
the pick-up and delivery points is given.
3.2 Impacts on the involved groups
When place B receives an RS instead of an FS, it is fruit-
ful to specify the monetary effects (Wi) for the following
four groups.
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 Impact on passengers travelling to/from place B
(WB). WB > 0 if the initiative is positive for the
population at place B, and WB < 0 if it is perceived
as negative. We reasonably assume that a change
from an FS to an RS is considered negative, implying
that WB < 0. A monetary value for WB can be
estimated by asking people at place B about their
willingness to pay to retain the FS.
 Impact on passengers travelling between A and C
(WAC). WAC > 0 if the initiative is advantageous for
these travellers, and WAC < 0 otherwise. Because a
change from an FS to an RS at place B sometimes
leads to shorter travel times for travellers between
place A and place C, we reasonably assume that this
situation is advantageous for them due to a
reduction in on-board travel time costs. This implies
WAC > 0.
 Impact on the service provider measured by changes
in the operator’s profits, including grants (WS). If
the transition from an FS to an RS at place B
increases (decreases) profits, WS >0 (<0). The
sign of WS depends on whether the cost
reduction is greater or less than the income
reduction.
 Impact on the transport authorities (WTA). If
necessary, subsidies to the operator increase, an RS
has a negative impact on the transport authorities’
budget, implying that WTA < 0. If an RS reduces
necessary grants, WTA > 0. The sign of WTA strongly
depends on the risk profile in the contract between
the authorities and the service provider.
In Section 4, we more thoroughly discuss the factors
that affect the magnitudes of these effects, and in Sec-
tion 5, we use a calculation example to exemplify the
procedure for estimating the impacts on the different
groups.
3.3 Political priorities and welfare economic
consequences
The welfare economic consequences (W) of implement-
ing RS at place B can be written as follows:
W ¼ WB þWAC þWS þ 1þ γð Þ WTA ð3:1Þ
where γ is the shadow price of raising public funds.1
When aiming to maximise social welfare, place B should
receive an RS if W > 0. Consequently, the same weights
are put on all four groups, and the decision is made
based on the Kaldor-Hicks criterion; see, for example,
Pindyck and Rubinfeld [29].
However, if regional policy goals that cause benefits
and disadvantages for different groups are given different
weights, the decision to implement an RS at place B can
be made based on the sign of the following weighted
sum (W∗):
W  ¼ WB þ wAC WAC þ wS WS þ wTA
 1þ γð Þ WTA ð3:2Þ
where, wAC, wS, and wTA are the relative weights the
Fig. 1 Place B switches from a fixed stop to a request stop
1Norwegian authorities recommend a value of γ = 0.20 (Ministry of
Finance, 2014).
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decision maker puts on the consequences for the
travellers between A and C, the profit for the service
provider, and the transport authorities’ budget, re-
spectively, compared with the consequences for those
living at place B. When wAC, wS, and wTA < 1, the de-
cision maker places the highest value on the welfare
of travellers living at place B. If W∗ > 0 (<0), the
transport authorities will (will not) recommend that
place B receives an RS. Different w-values can pro-
duce situations where W and W∗ have different signs.
If, for example, W∗ < 0 and W > 0, place B will retain
the FS, and the welfare loss of pursuing the politi-
cians’ priorities 2 is W.
Notably, setting the wAC, wS, and wTA values is a pure
political decision and founded on regional policy goals
for settlement patterns. Jørgensen, Mathisen, and Larsen
[17] use the Kaldor-Hicks criterion and observe that 21
of the 97 Norwegian ferry services in 2007 contributed
negatively to social surplus. By estimating ferry users’
welfare from these 21 services and the total costs of op-
erating them, Jørgensen et al. [17] estimate the weights
wi (i = 1, 2,…, 21) the decision makers (politicians) have
tacitly put on the welfare for these ferry users compared
with the welfare to the greater society. Their analysis
shows the threshold values of wi, which indicates that it
is desirable to maintain each of the socio-economically
unprofitable services, which varied from approximately
1.1 to 4.0. As expected, the value of wi was highest for
ferry services operating in areas that had a low popula-
tion and little traffic. This finding signals that the greater
society puts the highest weight on the welfare of the
people who live in small places.
The fast craft boats and the ferries operate in more or
less the same areas along the Norwegian coastline, and
the places where RSs are most relevant are small places.
Transferred to our model and Eq.(3.2), this suggests that
wB >wAC >ws >wTA but that the ratio,
wB
wAc
; can vary a lot
depending on the number of people living in places A,
B, and C.
4 Results and discussion
4.1 Travellers to/from the place with request stop
4.1.1 General considerations
The welfare consequences for this group of travellers are
illustrated in Fig. 2. The relationship between the annual
number of passengers (X) travelling to/from place B and
ticket price (P) equals D0 with an FS at place B, and D1
with an RS at place B. The change from an FS to an RS
has thus caused a negative shift in the demand curve for
trips to/from place B. When the ticket price is P0, re-
gardless of whether place B has an FS, the number of
trips declines from X0 to X1.
Figure 2 shows that the less negative the shift in the
demand curve and the higher the ticket price (P0), the
less negative the effect of an RS on travellers to/from
place B. The effect is also less negative as the demand
for trips to/from place B becomes more price elastic (the
curves D0 and D1 become less steep). Moreover, the dis-
advantages will decrease with the number of travellers
to/from place B, that is, the demand curve (D0) shifts to
the left. Last, the pre-booking procedures for an RS are
critical.
The disadvantages decrease with shorter pre-booking
times; thus, residents at place B do not have to make
their travel decision long before the journey occurs. This
finding more or less implies that spontaneous trips can
also occur with an RS. We also reasonably assume that
the more options an individual has to pre-book a trip
(call), the fewer disadvantages will result from a change
to an RS. If, for example, when a traveller can pre-book
a call by either cell phone, SMS, email, or a ‘reservation
app’, the disadvantages of an RS are small.
Despite today’s communication technology, re-
placing an FS with an RS results in less flexibility in
peoples’ travel opportunities, especially for elderly
members of the community unfamiliar with new
gadgetry. The tourist industry also claims that an RS
instead of an FS reduces the number of tourists be-
cause of their unfamiliarity with the booking rules.
Some fast craft operators in Norway have recently
sharpened the opportunities to book at short notice,
which makes an RS worse for inhabitants at place B.
Therefore, the pre-booking procedures result in some
people either forgetting to book a call or booking too
late. This finding implies that when switching from
an FS to an RS, a negative shift in the demand curve
can be expected (Fig. 2).
At least in Norway, most of the places where it is rele-
vant to change boat services from FS to RS are located
on islands or in small places with no road connections.
Thus, boat service is the only transport option. In such
cases, the demand curves D0 and D1 in Figure 2 are
steep (price inelastic), and the negative shift in the de-
mand curve from D0 to D1 is small but not negligible.
The travel demand from tourists and leisure travel from
the locals is sensitive to the booking system and the
ticket price. The reduction in consumer surplus or wel-
fare for those living at place B is equal to the shaded
area WB in Figure 2.
In the very few places where there are other transport
options, the demand curves in Figure 2 are flatter (price
2Suppose W∗ =WB +w[WAC +WS + (1 + γ)WTA], where w is the equal
weight put on all groups except those living at place B. WB < 0 and
WAC, WS, and WTA > 0 if place B receives an RS. If an RS is
implemented W∗ > 0, implying WB½WACþWSþð1þγÞWTA  < w. If, for example
,WB = − 100 and [WAC +WS + (1 + γ)WTA] = 125, an RS is
implemented at place B if w is higher than 0.80, and the social benefits
are 25.
Jørgensen and Solvoll European Transport Research Review           (2020) 12:31 Page 5 of 13
elastic). The more intense competition between the boat
service and the other transport services to/from place B,
the flatter the demand curves in Figure 2. Moreover, the
negative shift in the demand curve from D0 to D1 will be
greater. The reduction in the number of travellers that
use the boat service that offers RS instead of FS will in-
crease (s increases). If the number of travellers that use
alternative transport services increases with s∗, total traf-
fic to/from place B is reduced by (s − s∗) when B gets RS
instead of FS. This also indicates that the welfare loss for
the residents at place B is lower than the shaded area in
Figure 2 because they can use other transport means. In
our opinion, the value of s∗ is usually low, implying that
s and WB in Figure 2 are good estimates of the conse-
quences of offering RS instead of FS.
The fast craft boats also take and bring goods to the
RSs, and if the calls at these places are dependent on
whether anyone wants to travel to or from them, RSs
cause more uncertainty in the delivery of goods; notably,
the latter can be a major drawback for the inhabitants.
The value of WB can also be inferred mathematically.
Suppose the demand curves D0 and D1 on price forms
are P = a − b ∙ X and P = a − b ∙ (X + s), respectively, where
s = X0 − X1 is the horizontal negative shift in the demand
curve. When b increases, the trips become less price
sensitive, implying that the demand curves in Figure 2
become steeper. The values of X2 ¼ ab −s and X3 ¼ ab in-
dicate the market potential for traffic to/from place B
under RS and FS, respectively. When the ticket price is
P0, the consumer surplus for the population at place B
becomes 12 ∙b∙X0
2 , and 12 ∙b∙ðX0−sÞ2 under an FS and an
RS, respectively. The welfare changes from an RS for the
population at place B, WB, thereby becomes:




 b  X02
¼ −b  s  X0− 12  s
 
ð4:1Þ
When b, s, and X0 increase, WB declines; thus, the
consequences for the population at place B become
more negative. Hence, if X0 and b is lower when
there are transport options other than the RS service,
WB decreases, implying z lower loss for the popula-
tion at place B.
Fig. 2 Welfare consequences for the population at place B because of a change from a fixed stop to a request stop
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4.1.2 Empirical estimation of the consequences
The magnitude of the change in welfare (WB) for the
travellers to/from place B by introducing an RS can be
quantified in two manners. First, when the RS scheme
has been operating for some time, we can record the de-
crease in the number of passengers to/from place B, that
is, the difference s = (X0 − X1) in Eq. (4.1) and Figure 2. If
we also know the price elasticity of demand when P = P0
and X = X0, the slope of the curve D0 is determined (e.g.
[29]). The aforementioned indicates that we know the
values of b, s, and X0 in Eq. (4.1), and WB can be calcu-
lated. Second, instead of using market data, we can esti-
mate the disadvantages for these travellers from
implementing an RS by asking a representative sample
about their maximal willingness to pay to maintain an
FS at place B. In this manner, (WB) can be inferred.
Each of the two methods has at least one weakness.
The first method provides an imprecise estimate due to
uncertain assumptions regarding the forms of the de-
mand curves in Figure 2 and the point demand elasticity.
Moreover, the decrease in traffic (s) can only be calcu-
lated when an RS has been in operation for some time,
leading to an uncertain estimate of WB beforehand.
When the residents in place B have transport options
other than the boat, the second method can be better
than using market data because these options are inter-
nalised in the respondents’ answers. The better the other
travel options, the lower the stated value of WB. A
weakness with it is, however, that it may provide an
uncertain estimate because the respondents must
make hypothetical choices and can give strategic an-
swers [13]. The latter indicates that the respondents
answer in a manner that they believe can promote
their cause because they know they are not con-
fronted with their answers because of anonymity [24].
Thus, such surveys may overestimate the disadvan-
tages for the population of implementing an RS. An-
other method is to draw on experiences from other
places that have implemented an RS. However, such
analogous comparisons can be of limited value be-
cause circumstances vary widely by place [23].
4.2 Travellers to/from the places with fixed stops
4.2.1 General considerations
Suppose travel time between place A and place C (Fig-
ure 1) is T1 hours when there is no call at place B and
T0 hours when B is called.
3 The reduction in travel time
between place A and place C by omitting call at B (ΔT)
is
ΔT ¼ T 0−T1 ð4:2Þ
Consequently, when the time value for a representative
traveller is k0, his/her reduction in time costs (RT) when
place B is not called is
RT ¼ k0  ΔT ð4:3Þ
If the share of trips the vessel calls at place B is α, ex-
pected reduction in every traveller’s time costs (ERT) be-
tween place A and place C with a change from an FS to
an RS at place B is
ERT ¼ k0  1−αð Þ  ΔT ð4:4Þ
When α tends to zero (one), ERT tends to k0 ∙ ΔT (0).
The welfare consequences for travellers between place
A and place C are illustrated in Figure 3. The demand
curve, D(G), shows the relationship between the number
of travellers (Y) between place A and place C and each
traveller’s generalised travel costs (G).4 When place B
has an FS, the generalised travel costs between place A
and place C is G0, and the number of travellers is Y0.
When place B receives an RS instead of an FS, expected
generalised travel costs are reduced by ERT and result in
generalised costs G1 and Y1 to passengers. Thus, the ex-
pected benefits for travellers between place A and place
C by introducing an RS at place B (WAC) are equal to
the shaded area in Figure 3. In Figure 3, we easily ob-
serve that WAC increases the more elastic demand be-
tween A and C with respect to G, that is, the less steep
the demand curve. When the demand is completely in-
elastic, WAC = ERT ∙ Y0, that is, equal to the reduction in
expected time costs for these travellers when B has an
FS. Moreover, WAC increases when the demand curve
shifts to the right due to the higher traffic potential be-
tween place A and place C. This result is illustrated by
the dotted demand curve D(G)′.
The welfare gain estimated in Figure 3 for travellers
between place A and place C with an RS instead of an
FS at place B is based on the assumption that travellers
between place A and place C do not care about the in-
creased travel time variability between place A and place
C caused by this schedule change. If they do not have
fixed appointments at the destinations, they can use the
time in an equally efficient manner independent of ar-
rival times. However, this situation is seldom the case;
the travellers normally have appointments at destina-
tions A and C of various importance, which increase
3ΔT is the extra elapsed time and terminal time caused by calling place
B.
4Generalised travel costs are the sum of the ticket price and the time
costs [3]. We reasonably assume that the ticket price for those
travelling between place A and place C is unchanged, regardless of
whether place B is called. Then, the reduction in generalised travel
costs for each traveller between place A and place C, when there is no
call at place B, equals the reduction in expected time costs, that is,
equal to ERT.
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their unwillingness to make any appointments at A and
C before the arrival times when place B is called.
This situation is illustrated in Figure 4 for a journey
from place A to place C that starts at time t0. We let t1
and t2 be the arrival time at place C when B is called
and not called, respectively. If an appointment is made
before time t1, the probability of not reaching the ap-
pointment is (100· α) percent. With fixed calls at place
B, the vessel is thus always calling place C at the time t1.
When place B receives an RS, ΔT = t1 − t2 = T0 − T1 illus-
trates the time span of the arrival time at place C. Ex-
pected arrival time (Et) is
Et ¼ αt1 þ 1−αð Þt2 ð4:5Þ
Hence, Et is between t2 and t1 (Figure 4). It follows
from Eq. (4.5) that Et tends to t1 when α tends to 1. If
no appointments are made before t1, the expected hid-
den waiting time (EHT) at place C is
EHT ¼ t1− αt1 þ 1−αð Þt2½  ¼ 1−αð Þ t1−t2ð Þ ¼ 1−αð Þ  ΔT ð4:6Þ
Benefits for travellers from place A when place B is not
called thus critically depend on the difference in time
value per hour when on vessel (k0) compared with their
time value per hour (k1) during the time span (hidden
waiting time) EHT. A common assumption is that k0 > k1
[19]. Consequently, the expected reductions in travellers’
time costs (ETK) from the departure from place A until
they can start their errands at place C are
ETK ¼ k0−k1ð Þ  EHT ð4:7Þ
In summary, the benefits for the travellers between
place A and place C (WAC) with an RS at place B
increase:
 The larger reduction in travel time (ΔT) they receive
when place B is not called.
 The smaller share of the trips (α) between place A
and place C that call at place B.
 More passengers travelling between place A and
place C (Y0).
 The higher the difference between travellers’ time
values per hour when on the vessel and during their
hidden waiting time (k0 − k1).
WAC in Figure 3 provides a satisfactory picture of the
benefits for the travellers between place A and place C
when they can start their errands at the destinations dir-
ectly after the vessel has arrived. Thus, k1 = 0. WAC thus
denotes the maximum benefits for them. By contrast, if
they as well could have stayed on the vessel during the
time span between t2 and t1 (k1 ≈ k0), the benefits to
them approach zero.
Fig. 3 Welfare changes for travellers between place A and place C by introducing a request stop instead of a fixed stop at place B
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4.2.2 Empirical estimations of the consequences
The welfare consequences for people living at place A
and place C, with an RS at place B (WAC), can be esti-
mated. When the number of travellers between place A
and place C (Y0) and their generalised travel costs (G0)
with an FS at place B are known, we can infer an ap-
proximate estimate of the shaded area in Figure 3 by cal-
culating changes in expected generalised travel costs (G0
−G1) and by setting a value of the travellers generalised
cost elasticity.5 These calculations can be performed be-
fore the change. Another option is to ask a representa-
tive sample of travellers between place A and place C
about their maximum willingness to pay for an RS at
place B. The methodological challenges are the same as
when asking the population at place B about their will-
ingness to pay for FS.
4.3 The service provider
Four factors affect the shipping company’s profit when
there are RSs instead of an FS at place B. First, the rev-
enue from travellers to/from place B decreases. If these
passengers pay an average fare equal to P0, the reduction
in revenues are P0 ∙ (X0 − X1) (Figure 2). Second, reve-
nues increase due to a higher demand for trips between
place A and place C. If the average fare for travellers be-
tween place A and place C is P , this revenue increase is
P∙ðY 1−Y 0Þ . Third, the operating costs for the service
provider decrease because of a reduction in calls at place
B. If the cost reduction is ΔC per call and the vessel sails
N trips between place A and place C per year, annual
cost reduction is (1 − α) ·N · ΔC, where (1 − α) ·N is the
expected reduction in the number of calls at place B.
Furthermore, there can be a reduction in grants from
the transport authorities of (− WTA). The economic ef-
fects on the shipping company (WS) are summarised in
Table 1.
The size of the cost reductions the service provider
will receive with an RS instead of an FS at place B, de-
pends on the frequency (N) between place A and place
C, the share of trips (α) where the vessel calls at place B,
and the cost reduction (ΔC) each time the vessel omits
calls at place B. ΔC mostly represents reduced costs for
fuel and thereby depends on the reduced sailing distance
by omitting calls at place B. Whether a reduction in
grants occurs when an RS is introduced at place B de-
pends on the contract form between the service provider
and the transport authority [14, 36]. However, in the
long run (next contract period), we reasonably assume a
reduction in grants, implying that WTA > 0.
4.4 Transport authorities
The interrelationship between WS and WTA deserves
further comment. If a change from an FS to an RS
does not influence the authorities’ grant payments to
the operator, WTA = 0. Hence, if the company’s reve-
nues are less (more) reduced than the reduction in its
costs, WS > 0 (<0). When the transport authorities re-
duce the grants so that the service provider’s profit
including grants remains constant, WS = 0, whereas
WTA > 0. Providing that the change from an FS to an
RS implies that the operator’s profit before grants (π)
increases with Δπ, the increased profit will normally
be distributed between the operator and the author-
ities, that is, Δπ = WS + WTA. When the operator
only places weight on profit and the authorities only
place weight on subsidy requirements and WS, WTA >
0, no disagreements occur between the two parties
concerning the transition from an FS to an RS at
place B. The exact values of the WSπ and the
WTA
π ratios
depend partly on the regulation regime and partly on
the negotiating power between the two parties [12].
With a pure gross cost contract, the transport author-
ity experiences a net revenue change corresponding to
Table 1 Economic effects on the shipping company
1) Reduced revenues to/from place B: P0 ∙ (X0 − X1)
2) Increased revenues between place A and place C: P∙ðY1−Y0Þ
3) Reduction in operating costs: (1 − α) ∙ N ∙ ΔC
4) Reduction in grants: WTA
5) Change in profit before grants: Δπ = 2 + 3–1
6) Change in profit after grants: WS = 2 + 3–1 – 4
Fig. 4 Arrival times before and after place B receives an RS
5We deduce that WAC ¼ G0 ∙Y 02∙εG0 , where εG0 is the demand elasticity with
respect to generalised travel costs [see [17, 34] for further discussions].
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1) + 2) (Table 1). The reduced operating cost 3) entirely
passes on to the service provider. With a pure net cost
contract, the transport authorities experience no change
in subsidy requirements because the service provider is
responsible for revenues and operating costs. Whether a
tendering contract influences the authorities’ budget de-
pends on the contracts’ statement about the distribution
of revenue and cost changes between the parties. Conse-
quently, the change in WTA and WS strongly depends on
the risk profile in the tendering contract.
4.5 Several request stops
Quite a few boat routes in Norway have more than one
RS between the FSs. The reason for the impacts of such
cases is nearly the same as for the simple case with one
RS. In the following, we therefore briefly focus on the
consequences for the travellers between the fixed desti-
nations A and C.
We suppose there are B1, B2, ∙ ∙ ∙ BM places between
place A and place C that initially have FSs and where
the authorities are considering RSs at all these M places.
Moreover, we let αi be the share of trips the boat calls at
Bi with an RS and ΔTi be the extra travel time between
place A and place C caused by calling place Bi. If we
make two simple assumptions, that is, (1) the probability
of calling on place i is independent of whether other RSs
are called and (2) the extra time of calling place i is inde-
pendent of whether other RSs are called6, the expected




i¼1 1−αið Þ  ΔTi ð4:8Þ
Thus, when the passengers travel from place A to
place C and t∗ denotes the arrival time at place C with
FSs at all B’s, the expected arrival time at place C (Et)
when the B’s receive RSs is
Et ¼ t−ET ð4:9Þ
The expected hidden waiting time (EHT) at place C is.
EHT ¼ t−Et ¼ t−ðt−ETÞ ¼ ET ð4:10Þ
which is exactly equal to the expected reduction in
travel time between place A and place C. If we continue
to assume that the hidden waiting time cost per hour is
k1, the expected reduction in travellers’ time costs (ETK)
when travelling from place A and until they can start
their errands at place B is
ETK ¼ k0−k1ð Þ  ET ¼ k0−k1ð Þ 
XM
i¼1 1−αið Þ  ΔTi ð4:11Þ
We observe from Eq. (4.11) that ETK increases to (k0 ∙
ET) if the passengers are flexible and can spend their
hidden waiting time efficiently when they arrive at place
C (k1 = 0). Because αi ≥ 0 and ΔTi > 0, it follows from Eq.
(4.11) that the expected hidden waiting time at place C
increases with the number of requests stops between
place A and place C. Consequently, the benefits for
those travellers between place A and place C become
more dependent on their abilities and possibilities to
plan their stays at the destinations in a manner that
makes all their time spent there meaningful.
5 Application of the theoretical approach
A fast craft service initially connects places A, B, and C
with an FS (Figure 1). The authorities will replace the FS
with an RS at place B. We assume that there are no
transport options other than the fast craft service to/
from place B. Based on information on the
 number of passengers travelling to/from the three
places,
 passengers’ average time values,
 ticket prices to/from the three places,
 reduction in travel time between A and C when B is
not called,
 cost savings for the operator of omitting a call at
place B,
 frequency of the service, and
 tendering contract between the authorities and the
service provider,
we can calculate the welfare consequences for the four
groups involved. The parameter values in the example
are listed in Table 2, together with a reference to the
relevant formulas, tables, and figures.
Based on the numbers in Table 2, we calculate the
welfare economic consequences of implementing an RS
at place B (Table 3).
The example shows an annual increase in social sur-
plus of €58,250 when place B receives an RS instead of
an FS. Because both W and WS are positive, the shipping
company’s preferences are in line with what is econom-
ically profitable for society. The results in Table 3 in
combination with formula (3.2) imply that the author-
ities must, on average, put almost a 20 times higher
value on the welfare consequences for the residents of
place B if place B should continue to have an FS, that is
,W∗ < 0. This finding implies a welfare loss of €58,250.
The aforementioned calculations are critically
dependent on the proportion of times (the a-value) the
vessel must call on place B. If, for example, a increases
from 0.6 to 0.9 and WB is unchanged, WAC, WS, and
6The second assumption is reasonable. The first assumption is
debatable because calling another request stop increases the
probability that the vessel must call other request stops.
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WTA decrease to €2100, €26,250, and €1400, respectively.
This finding implies that W = €26,750. Consequently,
the positive welfare effects of replacing an FS with an RS
at place B are significantly reduced.
Notably, we disregard that travellers between place
A and C have increased uncertainty in travel time
with an RS at place B. Consequently, we overestimate
the positive effects of an RS at place B for these
travellers because we tacitly assume that their time
value (k1) during the hidden waiting time is zero; see
Eq. (4.7).
6 Summary and concluding remarks
In this paper, we have discussed welfare and distribu-
tional consequences of an RS instead of an FS, exempli-
fied by a fast craft route serving place A – B – C, where
place B receives an RS. Welfare economic effects (W)
are related to the residents of place B (WB), those




Eq. 4.1 X0 1000 Average number of passengers per year travelling to/from place B before an RS was implemented. The number is
representative of a typical Norwegian fast craft service.
Eq. 4.1 X1 950 Average number of passengers travelling to/from place B after an RS is implemented. This number can be
calculated by referring to the pre-booking procedures, experiences from services that previously have converted
calls from an FS to an RS, or by simply asking inhabitants at the actual place about their expected change in travel
behaviour.
Figure 2 P0 €15 The ticket price for those travelling to/from place B can be found from the fare tariff. An average travel distance on
fast craft services in Norway is approximately 30 km. In 2019, the fare for an adult for this distance was
approximately €15.
Table 2 P €20 Ticket price for those travelling between A and C. Because we assume that the distance A–C is longer than A–B and
B–C, we presume P > P0.
Eq. 4.1 WB € −
3000
The welfare change for the inhabitants at place B when place B receives an RS instead of an FS. The loss can be
calculated by, e.g. a survey among the inhabitants on their willingness to pay for not losing the FS.
Figure 3 Y0 10,000 Average number of passengers per year travelling between A and C when B has an FS.
Figure 3 Y1 11,000 Average number of passengers per year travelling between A and C after an RS is implemented at place B. This
number can be calculated by estimating expected reduction in generalised travel costs per passenger and
subsequently calculating the increase in the number of trips by using a generalised cost elasticity.
Eq. 4.2 ΔT 0.25 h The time savings for passengers between A and C by omitting a call at place B. These savings can be calculated by
the service provider based on the deviation from the main fairway and for a representative terminal time at the call.
Eq. 4.3 k0 €8 Average time value per hour for fast craft passengers can be derived from a travel survey on the current route.
Notably, €8 is a proxy for the average time value per passenger used in the cost–benefit analysis in Norway in 2019.
Eq. 4.4 α 0.60 Proportion of times people travelled to/from place B before an RS was implemented. The value of α can be found
from historical data on the travel activity.
Table 2 N 700 Annual number of trips offered between A and C. This number is found in the time table for the service in
question. Our example is based on a service with a daily round trip.
Table 2 ΔC €200 Cost savings for the service provider per trip by not calling place B. It is primarily reduced fuel costs and quay/
terminal costs. The value used is related to a call that increases the travel time between A and C by 0.25 h.
Table 2 WTA €28,
000
This number can be calculated based on the contract form. We assume that the contract says that 50% of the cost
reduction shall go to the service operator (Table 3).
Table 3 Annual welfare consequences for the involved groups
Welfare component Description Value (€) Calculations
WAC Welfare increase for the travellers between A and C 8400 Existing trips: [(0.25 ∙ 8) ∙ (1 − 0.6) ∙ 10,000] = 8,000
New trips: [(0.25 ∙ 8) ∙ (1 − 0.6) ∙ (11,000 − 10,000] ∙½ = 400
Sum: 8,400
WB Welfare changes for the residents at place B -3000 Based on a ‘willingness to pay survey’.
WS Increased profit for the service operator 47,250 Reduced revenues to/from B: [15 · (1,000 − 950)] = − 750
Increased revenues A–C: [20 · (11,000 − 10,000)] = 20,000
Reduced operating costs: [(1 − 0.6) · 700 · 200] = 56,000
Reduced grants: (56,000 · 0, 5) = − 28,000
Sum: 47,250
WTA Welfare effect of reduced payments of grants 5600 Contract formulation and γ = 0.20: (56,000 ∙ 0.5 ∙ 0.20) = 5,600
W Sum of welfare consequences 58,250 Sum of welfare consequences for all groups.
Jørgensen and Solvoll European Transport Research Review           (2020) 12:31 Page 11 of 13
travelling between place A and place C (WAC), the ser-
vice provider (WS), and the transport authorities (WTA).
The unweighted sum of the effects on all parties is the
total welfare economic effects (W) of implementing an
RS at place B. If W > 0, an RS is desirable from a welfare
perspective. However, due to regional policy goals, deci-
sion makers may place unequal weights on the welfare
for the four mentioned groups. Consequently, the value
of W and the weighted sum (W∗) can have different
signs. If W∗ < 0 and W > 0, the political weights put on
the welfare of the four groups imply that an RS at place
B will not be implemented, although this implementa-
tion would have increased social welfare by W. The wel-
fare effects of an RS can be summarised as follows:
 Travellers to/from place B experience a welfare loss,
implying WB < 0. The higher the traffic to/from the
place and the longer time ahead passengers must
pre-book a trip, the larger the disadvantages. Use of
digital pre-booking platforms and other transport
possibilities to/from place B reduce the
disadvantages.
 Travellers between place A and place C experience a
welfare gain (WAC > 0). Its magnitude increases with
the amount of traffic between these two places, the
passengers’ travel time values, and the more
sensitive demand with respect to generalised travel
costs. Moreover, WAC increases the fewer share of
the trips the vessel must call on at place B and the
more flexible plans the passengers can make at
destinations A and C.7 Last, good mobile signal
coverage along the route further strengthens these
advantages because of the possibilities passengers
have to inform others about the vessel’s expected
arrival time. Real-time information systems generate
similar benefits.
 The service provider experiences a reduction in
revenues to/from place B, increased revenues to/
from place A and place C, and reduced operating
costs. If the net effects of these changes imply lower
subsidy needs for the service provider, neither the
operator nor the authorities would normally be
worse off when B receives an RS. Thus, WS, WTA ≥
0. The risk sharing in the tendering contract
between them is crucial to how the potential
decrease in subsidy needs is distributed.
Finally, and notably, the benefits of implementing an
RS at place B strongly depend on how often the vessel
still must call on place B. If, for example, if place B must
be called on for more than 95% of the trips, an RS can
be directly disadvantageous; the inhabitants at place B
still have the inconvenience of pre-booking calls, and
passengers that travel between place A and place C re-
ceive an insignificant reduction in expected travel time.
Simultaneously, their travel time becomes more uncer-
tain. The proportion of trips to place B that must be
called with an RS is thus more important for the out-
come than annual traffic to/from place B. This result im-
plies that decision makers should increase their
emphasis on the distribution of traffic throughout the
week rather than the sum of yearly traffic.
The pure commercial savings of having an RS at a
place instead of an FS, the value of Δπ, are possible to
estimate quite accurately. However, measuring the mon-
etary impacts on the different affected groups involved is
far more difficult. In addition to calculations using Eq.
(3.1), decisions regarding route changes should be based
on sound judgements, thorough knowledge of traffic
patterns, and local conditions at the actual port of calls
along the route. Implementing an RS instead of an FS is
a question that will increase in relevance in the forth-
coming years because of changes in the settlement pat-
tern. Further empirical studies should more precisely
evaluate the effects of such measures to overcome the
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